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I. Introduction

While primary responsibility for regulating labor relations
affecting interstate commerce lies with the National Labor Re* B.A. 1951, University of California, Berkeley, LL.B. 1954, Yale Law
School. Ph.D. 1959, London University. Partner: Neyhart, Grodin, Beeson and Brundage. Member, California State Bar.
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lations Board, there are a number of significant areas in which
state courts may exercise jurisdiction; during 1969, California
courts had opportunity to determine a variety of issues raising
fundamental conflicts of position: The State Supreme Court
was called on to decide a case of classic tension between constitutional rights of free speech and private property/ and the
Courts of Appeal passed on the issue of employees' basic right
to organize, 2 a claim of duress by an employer who contended
he was "forced" to sign a collective bargaining agreement,3
and competing contentions with respect to the arbitrability of
certain disputes. 4 It was familiar territory for labor law, but
some new guidelines were posted.

II. Free Speech and Private Property
"The carrying of signs and banners, no less than the raising
of a flag, is a natural and appropriate means of conveying information on matters of public concern.,,5 Thus, dissemination of information through picketing or handbilling has long
been considered a form of speech protected by the First
Amendment. 6 Picketing, because it is viewed in the context
of a labor dispute as "something more" than speech, is subject
to regulation with respect to the lawfulness of the objective
sought or the particular means used,7 but picketing for a lawful
purpose and in a lawful manner cannot constitutionally be
enjoined. s
In recent years, courts have been called on to decide in
a number of cases whether and under what circumstances
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1. In re Lane, 71 Cal.2d - , 79 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 457 P.2d 561 (1969). For
further discussion of this case, see
Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in this
volume.
2. Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Association, 275 Cal. App.2d - ,
79 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1969).
3. Sabella v. Litchfield, 274 Cal. App.
2d -,78 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1969).
4. Leon Handbag Co. v. Local 213,
276 Cal. App.2d -,81 Cal. Rptr. 63
(1969).
512

5. Carlson v. State of California,
310 U.S. 106, 113, 84 L.Ed. 1104, 1108,
60 S.Ct. 746, - (1940).
6. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
7. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490, 93 L.Ed. 834, 69
S.Ct. 684 (1949).
8. International
Brotherhood
of
Teamsters, Local 695, A.F.L., v. Vogt,
Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 1 L.Ed.2d 1347, 77
S.Ct. 1166 (1957).
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picketing or handbilling may be subject to an injunction because the conduct takes place on privately owned property that
is generally open to public use. Many of the cases have involved shopping centers, and, in 1968, the United States Supreme Court held in Amalgamated Food Employees Union,
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza 9 that a state court could not
constitutionally enjoin union picketing in front of a store in
a shopping center, even though the shopping center, including
the property involved, was privately owned. Relying on
Marsh v. Alabama/o which involved a company town and
which held that "the more an owner, for his advantage, opens
up his property for use by the public in general, the more do
his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it,,,ll the Court in Logan
Valley Plaza reasoned that the shopping center mall
". . . is the funtional equivalent of a business block,
and for First Amendment purposes must be treated in
substantially the same manner.,,12
Were the rule otherwise, the Court observed, downtown businesses would be subject to on-the-spot public criticism for their
practices, but businesses in the suburbs "could largely immunize themselves from similar criticism by creating a 'cordon
sanitaire' of parking lots around their store."13
In 1969 in In re Lane/ 4 the California Supreme Court by
unanimous decision applied the Logan Valley Plaza doctrine
to protect union handbilling on a privately owned sidewalk in
front of a single grocery store that was not part of any shopping center. The sidewalk in Lane bordered the front of the
store and was used as access to and from a parking area extending approximately 150 feet to the nearest public street and
sidewalk. Recognizing that handbilling on this distant public
sidewalk would be an impractical means of reaching store cus9. 391 U.S. 308, 20 L.Ed.2d 603, 88
S.Ct. 1601 (1968).
10. 326 U.S. 501, 90 L.Ed. 265, 66
S.Ct. 276 (1946).
11. 326 U.S. 501, - , 90 L.Ed. 265,
- , 66 S.Ct. 276, 278.
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12. 391 U.S. 308, 20 L.Ed.2d 603,
- , 88 S.Ct. 1601, 1612.
13. 391 U.S. 308, - , 20 L.Ed.2d
603, -,88 S.Ct. 1601, 1612.
14. 71 Cal.2d - , 79 Cal. Rptr. 729,
457 P.2d 501 (1969).
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tomers, who typically used the parking lot and private sidewalk, the Court reasoned that a ruling of the private sidewalk
to be "off limits" for the exercise of First Amendment rights
would permit the store to immunize itself by the kind of "cordon sanitaire" against which Logan Valley Plaza warned. 15
Thus, in upholding the right to distribute the handbills in In
re Lane, the Court characterized Logan Valley Plaza as holding:
"
that when a business establishment invites the
public generally to patronize its stores and in doing so to
traverse a sidewalk opened for access by the public, the
fact of private ownership of the sidewalk does not operate
to strip the members of the public of their rights to exercise First Amendment privileges on the sidewalk at or
near the place of entry to the establishment. Hl6
III. Protection of the Right To Organize

Normally, protection of the right of individual employees
to join or participate in the activities of labor organizations is
a matter of federal law, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board. 17 But there are exceptions to this general rule, and one of them exists where the
employment relationship is expressly excluded from coverage
under the federal statute. Because agricultural labor falls
into this category,18 a California court, in Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Association/9 had an opportunity to consider
the scope of protection afforded agricultural labor by California law.
The plaintiffs in Wetherton had been employed by a carrot
producer in the Salinas Valley, and asserted that they had been
15. 71 Cal.2d -, - , 79 Cal. Rptr.
729, 732, 457 P.2d 561, 564.
16. 71 Cal.2d -, - , 79 Cal. Rptr.
729, 733, 457 P.2d 561, 565.
17. Compare San Diego Building
Trades Council Etc. v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 34 L.Ed.2d 775, 79 S.Ct. 773
(1959).
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18. Section 152(3) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 USC §§ 141
et seq., excludes "any individual employed as an agricultural laborer" from
one statutory definition of "employee."

19. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 543 (1969).
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discharged because they joined the United Farm Workers
Organizing Committee. In addition to the employer, two employer associations and their representatives were named as
defendants. The action was based on section 922, of the Labor Code,20 which prohibits "yellow dog" contracts (requiring, as a condition of employment, that the employee agree
not to join a labor organization) and on section 923,1 which
declares it to be the public policy of the state that workers
"shall be free from the interference, restraint or coercion of
employers" with respect to self-organization, designation of
representatives, and concerted activities. The action was settled as between plaintiffs and their former employer, but the
action was continued against the defendant employer associations on the theories that they constituted joint employers
and that they were participants in a conspiracy to commit
the wrongful act of firing. Affidavits indicated that one of
the respondents, the vice-president of both employer associations, did participate actively in the decision to fire the plaintiffs, but the Superior Court granted summary judgment in
favor of defendants on both causes of action, and plaintiffs
appealed.
20. Labor Code § 922 (Coercion Not
To Join Labor Organization Misdemeanor) read:
"Any person or agent or officer thereof who coerces or compels any person
to enter into an agreement, written or
verbal, not to join or become a member
of any labor organization, as condition
of securing employment or continuing
in the employment of any such person
is guilty of a misdemeanor."
1. Labor Code § 923 reads:
Declaration of Public Policy.
"In the interpretation and application
of this chapter, the public policy of
this state is declared as follows:
"Negotiation of terms and conditions
of labor should result from voluntary
agreement between employer and employees. Governmental authority has
permitted and encouraged employers to

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
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organize in the corporate and other
forms of capital control. In dealing
with such employers, the individual unorganized worker is helpless to exercise
actual liberty of contract and to protect
his freedom of labor and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of
employment. Therefore it is necessary
that the individual workman have full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives
of his own choosing, to negotiate the
terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the
interference, restraint, or coercion of
employers of labor, or their agents, in
the designation of such representatives
or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection."
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The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment with
respect to the joint employer theory; but it reversed with respect to the conspiracy theory, because it found a triable issue
of fact. With respect to the conspiracy question, the Court
concluded that the affidavits indicated that the vice-president
of the employer associations had met with and advised the employer concerning the discharge of plaintiffs, and had proposed to blacklist them with other employers, and that if this
could be established at trial the plaintiffs should prevail. The
Court also stated, in accord with a prior appellate decision,2
that section 932, established a basis for damages as well as
injunctive relief in the event of discharge for union activities.
In so doing, the Court significantly extended the protection
accorded labor under California law, for it rejected the arguments urged by defendants that section 922, provides only a
criminal penalty for violation and that section 923, is merely
an expression of public policy.
IV. Collective Bargaining Agreements

In the formative period of labor law, when the legal status
of collective bargaining agreements was still much in doubt,
employers frequently defended enforcement actions by asserting that the agreement was the product of duress, i.e., the result of threatened economic action by the union. But courts
rejected this defense on the ground that economic action is
inherent in the collective bargaining process. 3 Indeed, one
historian of labor law asserts flatly that "there is no reported
case of a collective bargaining agreement held void for duress."4 If that generalization requires some qualification with
respect to agreements signed under the threat of illegal strikes
or picketing,5 it appears at least to be accurate in the case of
2. Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock
Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App.2d 793, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 769 (1961).
3. E.g., Wasserstein v. Beim, 294
NYS 439 (Sup. Ct. 1937). See Annotation, 145 A.L.R. 1171.
4. Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining § 161 (1940).
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5. Compare Lafayette Dramatic Productions v. Ferentz, 305 Mich. 193, 9
N.W.2d 57 (1943). (Strike threat to
compel hiring of unwanted musicians,
deemed unlawful under state law.)
See Annotation, 145 A.L.R. 1171.
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economic action that is otherwise lawful. There have been
no reported cases invalidating a collective bargaining agreement for duress in the last 20 years.
It is, therefore, rather surprising to find the defense raised
at the appellate level in 1969, in the context of lawful union
activity, and even more surprising to find the Court according
it some recognition by way of dicta although rejecting its application to the facts of the case in question. In Sabella v.
Litchfield,s trustees of a union's health and welfare fund
brought suit for collection of contributions due from an employer, a restaurant owner, pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement that the latter had signed. The employer's defense
was that the agreement had been signed because of a threat
that a union representative would picket the restaurant on the
night on which a dinner was to be given in honor of the local
sheriff and that the dinner would have been cancelled if the
agreement had not been signed. The employer claimed he
had had no time to read the agreement and that he was not
aware of the provision requiring trust fund contributions.
These facts, the defendant-employer argued, constituted duress and undue influence. The trial court gave judgment for
the plaintiff on a directed verdict, and defendant appealed.
The reviewing Court, observing that the union had a legal
right to picket and that a threat to exercise that right could not
constitute duress, affirmed the judgment. It is of some interest, however, that the Court opined that its decision might
have been different if the union had made a "sudden demand,
utterly surprising in its terms," that might "cause an employer
to be so distraught that he would be unable to make a real
decision, but would yield his signature under emotional
stress;"7 however, the Court continued, because the employer
had a running dispute with the union, because the contract
that he signed was the standard agreement for the industry,
and because he failed to protest the trust fund provisions until
suit was brought, such a defense was not available. The
6. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr.
845 (1969).
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Rptr. 845, 846.
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Court cited no authority for its dicta and probably could not
have done so.

v.

Arbitration

Federal labor law strongly favors arbitration as a means of
resolving labor disputes, and the teaching of the United States
Supreme Court is that an order to arbitrate a grievance is not
to be denied "unless it may be said with positive assurance that
the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the asserted dispute.,,8 State courts are bound by
the same principle in suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization that represents employees in an industry "affecting commerce," as defined in the
federal act;9 even with respect to "intra-state" contractual relationships California law is in accord.lO
In Leon Handbag Co. v. Local 213,11 the employer, a handbag manufacturer, notified the union representing its employees that because of changes in the industry, it intended
to cease manufacturing and to engage in the jobbing of handbags, which it would either import from other countries or
arrange to have made through independent contractors. The
union immediately objected that the proposed action would
violate the collective bargaining agreement, which prohibited
"outside contracting" except "in extreme emergencies and only
after consultation with the union. "12 The employer brought
suit in state court for declaratory judgment in support of its
"right" to change its business from manufacturing to jobbing
as announced.
The union demurred to the employer's complaint on the
ground that the agreement contained a broad grievance and

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/18

8. United Steelworkers v. Warrior
and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, 1417, 80 S.Ct.
1347, - .
9. E.g., Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 7 L.Ed.2d 593, 82 S.
Ct. 571 (1962).
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10. Posner v. Grunwald-Marx Inc.,
56 C2d 169, 14 Cal. Rptr. 297, 363 P.
2d 313 (1961).
11. 276 Cal. App.2d - , 81 Cal.
Rptr. 63 (1969).
12. 276 Cal. App.2d - , - , 81 Cal.
Rptr. 63, 64.
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arbitration clause that called for arbitration of "any grievance,
difference or dispute which arises concerning working conditions or interpretations or application of this agreement.,,13
The trial court sustained the demurrer. On appeal, the employer conceded that federal law was controlling and that the
proposed contracting arrangement would be subject to the
arbitration clause, but it contended that the demurrer was
improperly sustained because its "absolute right to cease and
terminate its business"14 was not subject to arbitration. In this
connection, the employer relied on federal precedent to the
effect that complete cessation of business cannot be held an
unfair labor practice, even if motivated by antiunion considerations. 15
The reviewing Court rejected the employer's argument and
upheld the judgment on the demurrer. It was clear from the
face of the complaint, the Court held, that the employer was
not terminating its business, but rather changing its manner
of operation, and, on the basis of the broad arbitration clause
together with a sweeping "no-strike" obligation on the part of
the union, "it cannot be said that the arbitration provisions
do not cover the asserted dispute.,,16
While Leon Handbag represented the usual situation in
which the issue is whether a particular dispute should be decided by the court or by an arbitrator, the situation was more
complicated in San Diego etc. Carpenters v. Wood, Wire, etc.
Union,17 where the collective bargaining agreement established
two types of arbitral procedures and the question was which
type was applicable to a particular dispute. An agreement
between the employer, a construction contractor, and the
Lathers Union contained a general arbitration clause providing for disputes to be submitted to an arbitration board, which
was described in the agreement as a Joint Committee. It also
13. 276 Cal. App.2d - , -,81 Cal.
Rptr. 63, 64.
14. 276 Cal. App.2d - , - , 81 Cal.
Rptr. 63, 64.
15. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 13 L.
Ed.2d 827, 85 S.Ct. 994 (1964).
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276 Cal. App.2d - , 81 Cal.
63, 65.
274 Cal. App.2d - , 79 Cal.
164 (1969).
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contained a specific clause relating to "jurisdictional disputes,"
which were to be determined not by the Joint Committee, but
by the National Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes, which had been established by the Building
Trades Department of the AFL-CIO. A dispute arose as to
whether the employer was in violation of the agreement by
assigning certain work, concerning the installation of panels
of plaster base material, to employees represented by the carpenters union rather than to employees represented by the
lathers union. The lathers union claimed such work was
covered by its agreement, but the carpenters union also
claimed the work under its agreement with the same employer.
The lathers union, rather than submit the dispute to the
National Joint Board, chose instead to submit it to the Joint
Committee (established under its own agreement). That
committee decided against the employer and levied a fine of
$400, but the Superior Court, on petition by the employer and
the carpenters union, set aside the award and the reviewing
Court affirmed. Since the issue was not whether the dispute
should be arbitrated but which tribunal should arbitrate it, the
Court reasoned that the national policy favoring arbitration
did not preclude a decision vacating the award, and it was for
the Court to decide which of the two procedures was applicable. The lathers union argued that the dispute was not "jurisdictional," but the product of unilateral action on the part of
the employer, and that even if it were "jurisdictional," the
agreement did not preclude the Joint Committee from ruling
on it. The Court rejected both of these arguments in favor
of resolution of the dispute by the National Joint Board.
Weighing heavily in the Court's evaluation of the situation
was the fact that two unions were involved, each asserting
rights under its own agreement. Relying on federal precedent
to the effect that a collective bargaining agreement is not an
ordinary contract governed by common-law principles, and
that in order to interpret such an agreement, "it is necessary
to consider the scope of other related collective bargaining
agreements, as well as the practice, usage, and custom pertainhttp://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/18
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ing to all such agreements,"18 the Court observed that arbitration under each union's separate agreement "would not finally
settle the dispute between all of the parties interested because
of the probability of divergent results."19 The National Joint
Board procedure, by contrast, provided a procedure that was
intended to be binding upon all parties.
VI. Conclusion

The court's concern with the probability of divergent results
if each union were to proceed under its own agreement, points
to difficult legal questions: What if the lathers union agreement had not contained special provisions for resolution of
work assignment disputes? Would the award of the Joint
Committee under the lathers union agreement have been
enforced under those circumstances? What about the interests of the carpenters union, which did not participate in the
Joint Committee proceedings, or the interests of the employer,
faced potentially with conflicting awards, each exposing him
to further liability if he conforms to the other? The questions
are of enormous practical significance, both because the
survival of the National Joint Board is at present in serious
doubt, and because many work assignment disputes arise
among parties who are not subject to the National Joint Board
procedure.
There are two basic views of the situation. One is that
arbitration is a purely contractual institution, with which the
courts may not interfere. The arbitrator's jurisdiction is based
exclusively on the collective bargaining agreement between
the employer and (typically) a single union. If the agreement provides for arbitration of a dispute as to whether particular work is to be assigned to members of the bargaining
unit represented by that union, then the arbitrator is to decide
the dispute based solely on the terms of that agreement. Unless the agreement so provides or all parties are willing, he may
not permit the intervention of a second union in the proceed18. 274 Cal. App.2d - , - , 79 Cal.
Rptr. 164, 167.
CAL LAW 1970
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ing, nor may he decide the dispute on the basis of some other
union's agreement. If the result, in a situation in which two
unions each claim the same work, is that two arbitrations
are conducted, and the arbitrators come up with conflicting
awards, this is the employer's problem; he may have to pay
damages to one union or the other, but this is the price he must
pay for having entered into two agreements covering the same
work. This view is supported to some extent by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Carey v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.,20 which the court in the San Die~o case (properly) distinguished as not involving any provision for joint arbitration
procedure.
The other view, represented by a recent decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Ciruit, l is that ordinary principles of contract are not applicable to collective bargaining
agreements or to labor arbitration, and that it is both permissible and desirable, at least in certain cases, for a court to
order tripartite arbitration where two unions and two agreements are involved. In that case, an employer faced with conflicting demands in a work assignment suit and a pending
arbitration with only one of the two unions, brought suit in
federal district court to enjoin the pending arbitration and to
compel a tripartite joint arbitration with both unions included.
Both agreements contained broad arbitration provisions, and
the second union was willing to accept the arbitrator selected
by the first. The federal district court granted the employer's
request, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the
district court had power to order a joint arbitration and that,
under the circumstances, the power was not abused. The
Court did not speculate as to what would be the proper result
in a situation in which the two unions disagreed as to the
selection of an arbitrator or arbitration panel. Conceivably,
the Court could seek to persuade the parties to agree to tripartite arbitration by enjoining any arbitration proceedings
unless agreement was reached, but that would be particularly
20. 375 U.S. 261, 11 L.Ed.2d 320,
84 S.Ct. 401 (1964).
1. Columbia Broadcasting System,
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Inc. v. American Recording and Broadcasting Association, 414 F.2d 1326
(1969).
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awkward in a case like the San Diego case, in which each
union's contract specified an established arbitration board.
The issue is on the brink between private contract and judicial
creativity, and the cases could fall either way.

*
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